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ABSTRACT
The effects of unions on a variety of job outcomes are estimated using
the 1977 Quality of Employment Survey data for hourly wage earners. A
theory of how unions affect different job outcomes is presented. Alternative
estimating techniques are discussed. The major findings are that unions
increase wages and the availability of fringe benefits, produce higher com-
pensating differentials for hazardous work, reduce the wage premium paid
for high discretion or skill, increase the perceived value of one's job
relative to potential alternative jobs, increase the amount of say workers
want on their jobs, increase the willingness of workers to trade off wage
increases for improvements in other job conditions, marginally increase
job satisfaction with bread and butter issues and decrease satisfaction
with job content, and marginally decrease the perceived ability to change
employer policies. The need for further analysis of the variation in union
effects rather than the "average" effect is stressed.
The Effects of Collective Bargaining
on Economic and Behavioral Job Outcomes
The purpose of this study is to specify and apply a theoretical
framework for assessing the effects of collective bargaining on a variety
of economic and behavioral outcomes individual workers experience on their
jobs. The empirical analysis is based on data from the 1977 Quality of
Employment Survey (QES). Greater emphasis is given to the theory than the
specific empirical estimates, however, since better theory is badly needed
in order to draw meaningful conclusions from the expanding number of
empirical studies assessing the effects of trade unions and collective
bargaining.
A number of recent developments in the literature on the effects of
trade unions and collective bargaining make this an opportune time to criti-
cally appraise the approaches taken to the study and analysis of this phenomenon.
First, the growth of micro data sets has moved the analysis of the effect of
unions from industry or occupational to the individual or establishment levels.
Second, the range of job outcomes examined has expanded far beyond wages to
include such outcomes as fringe benefits (Freeman, 1978), layoffs (Medoff, 1979),
occupational safety (Olson, 1979), other working conditions (Duncan and Stafford,
1980), turnover (Freeman, 1978; Borjas, 1979; Farber, 1979), job satisfaction
(Freeman, 1978; Borjas, 1979), and productivity (Brown and Medoff, 1978).
Third, the increasing sophistication of the econometric techniques used to study
union effects has introduced a variety of new models and specifications for
researchers to choose from in estimating the effects of unions and collective
bargaining. For example, the theory of compensating differentials has been used
to justify using a simultaneous equations framework to estimate the joint effects
of unions on wages and working conditions (Smith, 1979; Duncan and Stafford, 1980).
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2The belief that union membership should be treated as an endogenous rather than
an exogenous event has led to the use of two-stage least squares instead of
ordinary least squares equations (Schmidt and Strauss, 1976; Lee, 1978; Schmidt,
1978). Fourth, behavioral scientists have begun to show an interest in integrating
the effects of unions and collective bargaining into their models of job attitudes,
motivation, and behavior (Hammer, 1978; Kochan, 1980; Gordon, et al., 1979;
Brett, 1980).
All of these developments represent an encouraging sign that the study of
the effects of unions and collective bargaining is undergoing both a revival
and a transformation. It is a revival in the sense that it returns to the
questions addressed in the classic economic study of Lewis (1963) and the
corresponding behavioral studies of a somewhat earlier time period. It is
a transformation in that the current generation of studies use larger data
sets, more advanced statistical models and techniques, and attempt to integrate
the study of unions into prevailing economic and behavioral theories.
While this renewed interest is encouraging, the major shortcoming of
efforts so far is the lack of a coherent theory of the effects of unions and
collective bargaining on the job outcomes of individual workers. The absense
of a coherent theory has led to overexperimentation with a host of different
specifications of the estimating equations. Given the cross sectional designs
that these studies use, different specifications are very likely to provide
different results. Comparison of the conflicting results found in two recent
papers (Schmidt and Strauss, 1976; Schmidt, 1978) that use different models
and the same data vividly illustrates the problem. The lack of a sound theory,
therefore,makes choice of the appropriate model and estimating procedure
difficult, and interpretation of the results hazardous. This paper will,there-
fore,concentrate quite heavily on presenting a theory of how unions and
11
3collective bargaining influence the job outcomes of workers covered under
union contracts and will attempt to spell out the theoretical assumptions that
underlie the different statistical techniques that have been used to estimate
the effects of unions.
The next section of the paper will outline a theory of how unions affect
the job outcomes of individual workers covered under a union contract. Then
the different statistical techniques used to model the effects of unions and
collective bargaining will be reviewed paying special attention to the implicit
or explicit theoretical assumptions underlying each. Empirical tests using
the QES data follow in the next section. The final section draws together the
empirical findings and the theoretical issues to offer implications for
future research and policy debates on the effects of unions and collective
bargaining.
The Theory
The theory developed here was formulated by integrating four broad sets
of factors that need to be taken into account in conceptualizing the effects
a union will have on the job outcomes of individual workers. The first set of
considerations is the expectations that workers in general, and union members
in particular, have of trade unions. Because unions are representative
organizations they must attempt to order their priorities and allocate their
resources in a manner that reflects the goals and expectations of their members.
Thus, one building block in a theory of what unions do in collective bargaining
should be what workers expect them to do. A second consideration is the power
that a union has to achieve substantive improvements in the job related goals
that it pursues. A union must achieve improvements primarily through collective
bargaining by changing employer behavior or by getting the employer to agree
to make changes in the terms and conditions of employment. Because the interests
of the employer and employees conflict, a union must be able to amass sufficient
_~~~~~_ 1 _ 1  ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ _ __~~~~~~_____~~~~--
4bargaining power in order to achieve its goals. A third consideration should
be the responses of employers to union negotiated changes in the employment
contract. Over time employers engage in a number of adaptive strategies to
recoup the labor cost impacts of union induced changes in the employment
contract. These adaptive strategies in turn influence the relationship between
the initial union induced contract changes and the ultimate effects on the job
experiences and outcomes of workers. This adaptive behavior, therefore, should
be incorporated into a theory of union effects. A fourth consideration in a
theory of union effects should be the exogenous influences of external conditions,
particularly, the effects of the competition in the labor and product markets
and government policies that regulate the employment relationship. No theory
of union effects can afford to ignore the influence of the economic and legal
environment in which unions and employers make decisions. Finally, any theory
of the effects of unions, and especially a theory that is tested with cross
sectional data, must incorporate an understanding of the history of union
organizing, the factors that motivated employees to unionize in previous time
periods, the conditions that motivate workers to organize now, and the ways
workers obtain jobs that are already unionized.
While this may not exhaust all of the factors that should go into a theory
of the effects of unions on job outcomes, it does go beyond the more limited
views that are found in previous works by economists who often ignore the role
of bargaining power and over emphasizethe role of competitive market forces
or by behavioral scientists who tend to focus more on employee expectations
and ignore the role of power and the effects of economic forces.
The major propositions in the theory are diagrammed in Figure 1. The
general framework draws heavily on the recent work of Freeman and Medoff (1979).
The effects of unions on job outcomes are seen as involving three sequential
stages. Stage one focuses on the initial, primary, and dominant effects a union
5is expected to have on the economic terms and conditions of the employment
contract. Stage two then focuses on the adjustments employers make to cope
with these primary effects in order to remain competitive. Stage three examines
the joint effects of the managerial adjustment and the union responses they
generate on the more behavioral aspects of union members' jobs.
Stage One: The Primary Union Effects
The propositions in the first stage of the model are primarily derived
from the goals and expectations that union members have of their unions.
American workers have historically been, and currently are motivated to join
unions out of a desire to improve their wages, fringe benefits, and working
conditions and to increase their ability (power) to bring about changes in other
substantive terms and conditions of employment. Furthermore, union members
expect their unions to place high priority on the traditional "bread and butter"
issues of wages, fringes, job security, etc. (Kochan, 1979). Therefore, the
primary or first order effects of unions should be to improve these aspects
of the employment relationship. Because wages are the primary factor in setting
the price of labor and the economic rewards associated with the job, we will
further assert the initial efforts of unions are normally devoted to improving
wages.
The ability of a union to achieve improvements in these first order
conditions depends on the amount of power it can bring to bear in collective
bargaining. Although the concept of union power has proved to be an elusive
one, there is sufficient empirical evidence that (1) on average unions do
increase the wages and fringe benefits of their members, and (2) the size of
the union effect varies considerably across occupations, industries, and
over time. Furthermore, there has been some progress recently in identifying
the sources of power that help explain the variation in union effects. For
example, strikes, the structure of bargaining, extent of union organization,
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7the nature of the public policies that regulate bargaining, the degree of
industry concentration and/or regulation, management wage policies, the state
of the labor market, and other economic variables have all been used to
explain variations in wages and other bargaining outcomes under collective
bargaining (Hammermesh, 1970; Farber, 1974; Kochan and Wheeler, 1975;
Gerhardt, 1976; Kochan and Block, 1977; Ashenfelter, Johnson, and Pencavel,
1972; Hendricks, 1975; Anderson, 1979 (a) and (b); Hendricks, Feuille, and
Szerszman, 1979; Mitchell, 1979; Ehrenberg, 1979). The common theoretical
argument underlying these separate studies is that all of the variables
examined in some way contribute to or constrain the ability of a union to
achieve substantive wage gains above what the competitive market or the
employer would unilaterally provide. This theoretical proposition will be
referred to as the "union power" hypothesis.
To the extent that unions are successful in improving wages, there will
be some "roll up" effects on fringe benefits as well. In addition,unions attempt
to improve fringe benefits directly, since members are sensitive to the package
or distribution of benefits,as well as the level of wages and will prefer to
put more effort into improving fringes as their wage levels increase. Thus,
we also expect a positive union-nonunion fringe benefit differential. To the
extent that unions have sufficient power to increase wages and/or benefits, they
should also be able to better achieve other goals that workers expect of them.
Therefore, the "union power" hypothesis would suggest that positive relationships
should exist between unionization, wages, fringe benefits, and other terms and
conditions of employment that are favorable to employees.
Stage Two: The Management Adjustment Process
The next step in tracing the effects of unions requires an analysis of
how management responds to changes in the labor contract. Increases in
wages, benefits, or other terms of the labor argument should set in motion a
8set of managerial adjustments. The central question here is how does management
cope with or adjust to the increases in labor costs that are likely to occur
as a result of collective bargaining? Freeman and Medoff (1979) argue that
the effects of unions and collective bargaining on productivity depend on the
way management adjusts to union induced changes in the employment relationship.
They propose two alternative routes that firms may use to react to unions and
collective bargaining. The first route is based on standard neo-classical
economic theory and the second route is based on the "shock effect"
hypothesis.
Neo-classical theory suggests that increases in labor costs result in
some combination of the following responses: (1) a reduction in the scale of
output and employment, (2) an increase in the price of the product, or (3) a
substitution of capital for labor. The underlying assumption of this neo-
classical proposition is that the system was in fact in equilibrium prior to
unionization (or prior to the negotiated increase) i.e., that the employer had
been operating at peak efficiency.
The shock effect proposition was first developed by Sumner Slichter (1941).
He argued that the presence of a union and/or the negotiation of a new contract
forces management to search for more efficient means of running the firm. In
addition, increases in wages and other improvements in the terms and conditions
of employment may have off-setting effects on other personnel costs (e.g.,
turnover and recruiting costs) and thereby reduce the pressure on unit labor
costs. Therefore, in order to trace the effects of collective bargaining through
to its conclusion one must also look at how management tries to absorb or adapt
to higher labor costs.
Figure 1 illustrates some of the paths these adjustments might take.
Increases in wages and fringe benefits, or improvements in other terms of
employment may reduce voluntary turnover and thereby reduce hiring and training
costs and help the firm retain highly productive employees. Over time, higher
9wages should allow the firm to recruit higher quality workers for bargaining
unit positions. Managers may gain increased employee motivation or effort
from improvements in the terms of the contract, invest more in training in
order to improve the ability or skill levels of employees, or become more
efficient in the use of supervisory and human resource planning functions by
formalizing policies, increasing the use of personnel and labor relations
specialists, etc.
Step 3: The Secondary Effects
Suppose a union is successful in increasing wages and fringe benefits and
the employer takes steps that are consistent with either the neo-classical
or the shock effect response to increased labor costs, or some combination or
both. The employer's response affects employee welfare. Depending on its
form, the response may reduce the number of jobs in the bargaining unit, change
the way in which the work is organized or the technology used to perform the
work, increase the speed of production or the closeness of supervision, or
reduce expenditures in other areas affecting the job environment (e.g.,
investment in plant maintenance, new equipment, health and safety devices,
etc.). These managerial responses are likely co produce a counter vailing union
response to deal with the job security and working conditions problems they
generate. The greater the size of the wage and benefit premiums won by the
union, the stronger the motivation on management to tighten up and reduce
expenditures in these other areas, and the more sensitive the union members
will become to these working conditions and job security concerns. Furthermore,
higher wages and improved benefits will lead workers to place a higher priority
on gaining improvements in other areas of the employment relationship for both
economic and psychological reasons. For example, the marginal tax rate on
wages has increased, and these other aspects of the employment relationship
presumably are positive economic goods that the majority of union members will
10
want to "purchase" as their incomes rise. There is ample behavioral theory
and evidence that also explains and documents the fact that employee interest
in nonwage aspects of their jobs increases as wages increase.
The traditional response of unions of employer and employee pressures to
address these issues has been to negotiate (1) job security protections, (2)
work rules that limit the ability of management to speed up the pace of work,
(3) more time off with pay to ease job pressures and spread work opportunities
as a means of protecting job security (e.g., lunch rest periods, shorter hours,
added vacation and holiday time, higher overtime premiums, etc., and (4) safety
and health protections and procedures. Employers can be expected to resist
these union proposals because many further increase labor costs, reduce managerial
discretion, and expand the scope of union influence. The ability of a union
to achieve these contract provisions will again, therefore, be dependent on
its power.
More recently,unions have been under some pressure from social critics
to go beyond these "traditional" responses to try to improve the quality of
working life directly by (1) getting workers more say over how their jobs are
performed, (2) redesigning the job and work group structures to make work more
interesting, and (3),in general, devising more direct strategies for coping with
mental stress, job dissatisfaction, and related psychological reactions that
workers have to their jobs.
Much less is known about the effects of unions on these aspects of the
employment relationship. While a majority of union members apparently would
.1
like to see their unions put some or a great deal of effort into improving these
aspects of their employment relationship, members still assign a lower priority
to having their unions attend to these issues than the traditional "bread and
butter" issues of wages, benefits, and job security (Kochan, 1979).
The ultimate effect of unions on these issues depends on (1) the intensity
of effort afforded them, and (2) the intensity of management resistance or support
for efforts designed to address the psychological aspects of the emDloyment
relationship. Because these issues fall more within the domain of the personnel
function of the firm and are at, or in most cases beyond, the frontier of the
collective bargaining relationship, we can expect that the effects of unions in
general, and of union power, to be weakest in this area. Managerial policies
and practices are more likely to exert a dominant effect on the psychological as-
pects of the employment relationship. If unions are having an effect on those issues,
it is most likely to be an indirect one through their influence on (1) working
conditions, and (2) personnel policies and practices.
The central implication that can be drawn from the above discussion is that
the effects of unions on an array of job outcomes depends on the relative strength
of two opposing forces -- the power of the union to achieve its objectives versus
the ability of the employer to respond to union gains in one area by holding the
line on improvements in other areas. As we move from the primary or traditional
areas of union efforts to the issues that are more marginal to the union, the
effects of union power are expected to diminish relative to the importance of
managerial policies and practices.
The sequential effects of unions in collective bargaining can be summarized
in the following propositions:
1. The primary effect of unions will be to increase wages and fringe benefits
and to improve working conditions of their members. Of these effects the
initial and dominant effect of unions will be on wages.
2. The greater the union power, the more the wages of the union members will
exceed wages of nonunion workers on comparable jobs.
12
3. The more unions raise wages, the higher fringe enefits tied to wages
will be.
4. The more unions increase wages, the higher priority union members will
assign to improving fringe benefits, working conditions, job security,
and other provisions of the collective bargaining contract.
5. The greater the union power, the more successful the union will be
in improving the fringe benefits, job security, working conditions,
and other terms of the labor agreement and the less the employer will
be able to recoup higher wages through tradeoffs or compensating
differentials in these areas of the employment relationship.
6. The areater the union power the more the employer will formalize personnel
and labor relations policies and practices in order to recoup the
increased costs associated with the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement.
7. The effect of the union on the attitudes and behavior of individual
workers, depends on the joint effects of the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement and the ways the employer adapts its personnel
and labor relations practices and policies.
The above propositions summarize the series of events that are set in motion
as a result of unionization and that need to be addressed if we are to trace the
overall effects of collective bargaining on job outcomes. In the following
sections we will explore the ways these issues have been modelled.
Alternative Estimating Models
Spillover Effects
Several technical problems arise in modeling the effects of unions. One well
known problem involves the "spillover" effects of union contract changes to the
nonunion sector as nonunion employers match union negotiated wage increases
or other improvementsin order to discourage their employees from unionizing.
This problem is especially severe in the more aggregate level studies because
of wage imitation among employers in the same industry or occupations. It
becomes less of a problem when large national samples of individuals are used to
estimate the effects of unions. For this reason it will not be dealt with in
13
this research. The effect of unions on waqes and other job outcomes will, however,
be understated to the extent that spillover bias is not eliminated from the
1
analysis.
Definition of the Union Effect
The choice of an estimating technique must start with a clear definition
of the "union effect" being estimated. The traditional definition of the union
effect on wages is the proportionate difference in the wage paid a unionized
worker relative to a similar nonunion worker (Lewis, 1963). That is, the
referrent here is the individual worker and the comparison is presumably what
that worker could command in the competitive labor market. This definition,
however, may understate the cumulative effects of a union on the terms and
conditions of employment offered for the jobs covered in the bargaining units
contained in the sample. It is important to remember that unions negotiate
conditions of employment for a specified set of bargaining unit positions or
jobs. The employer (except in some craft union settings) is responsible for
choosing who is hired into these ositions, at least at the initial point of
entry into the organization,
Suppose for example, a union organizes a bargaining unit at point tO
and increases the wages paid for the jobs in this bargaining unit by 20 percent.
Over time, however, as the original members of the bargaining unit retire, quit,
or are terminated, the employer may replace these workers with workers of higher
quality. If the Lewis definition of the union effect is used and human capital
characteristics are included in the estimating equation as control variables
1An indirect type of union spillover may also occur as follows: If wages rise
in the union sector and unionized employment opportunities decline and surplus
employment exists in the nonunion sector which further depresses nonunion wages.
.:· _ _I_______D_·_PI_·___I_
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(or if a simultaneous equation model is used that includes human capital
variables in a union membership equation), the union effect will be understated.
Instead, an estimate of the effect of the presence of the union at point t on
the wages of that worker will be obtained. It will not, however, capture the
historical effects of the union on the wages paid for the jobs in the
bargaining unit.
Neither of these definitions, i.e., the effects of unions on the wages of
individual workers, or on the jobs included in the bargaining unit, is
inherently superior. If the objective is to capture the complete historical
effects of unions then the job is the more appropriate referent. This is
especially important if one wants to make inferences about what would have
happened in the absence of the union, or what would likely happen over time
if the union was to disappear, since presumably the employer would slowly
readjust to the preunion pattern of recruitment and personnel management. If,
however, the objective is to determine the size of the wage premium that
current workers receive from unionization, net of past employer adjustments,
then the individual worker is the appropriate referent point.
All of the empirical studies that followed Lewis have adopted his
definition of union effect, For the sake of comparison we will do the same, now
that the reader has been duely cautioned about its limitations and biases.
Union Membership as an Exogenous or Endogenous Variable
Another problem relates to whether union membership should be treated as an
exogenous variable, or as one that is caused by some combination of other job
characteristics such as the wage level, working conditions, job security, etc.
A number of researchers have recently argued that unionization is a function of
wages, selected working conditions, individual, or industry characteristics
(Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1972: Schmidt and Strauss, 1976: Duncan and Stafford,
15
1978: Lee, 1978). Suppose, for example, unions tend to organize high wage indus-
tries or workers. In this case the union coefficient in an ordinary least
square regression equation captures both the effects of unions on wages
(the true effect of interest) and the effects of wages on unions. Therefore,
estimates of unions on wages will be overstated unless this simultaneous
and/or reciprocal causality is eliminated from the estimates.2 Alternativelv
if unions tend to organize low wage workers, failure to eliminate this effect
will understate the true effects of unions on wages. The same problem would
occur in estimating the effects of unions on other job outcomes to the extent that
certain good (bad) outcomes cause unionization. Recoanition of this problem has
led to the use of two stage least squaresw-Whereby the first stage of the equation
estimates the probability of being unionized,and the second stage uses this
probability as the independent variable for generating the estimate of the net
effect of unions on wages.
In a cross sectional tudy there is no unambiguous way to determine through
statistical analysis which specification of the model most accurately captures
the true effects of unions. Therefore, we have to depend on the theory
underlying the alternative specifications to make our choice of an appropriate
model. The major problem with the studies using the two stage models is that
the theoretical rationales used to justify their approach are often
contradictory, and in some cases, are based on misguided or illogical premises. 3
2 The technical problem involved here is that OLS assumes the error term is uncor-
related with the independent variables in the equation. Tf the probabilit o being
a union member is a function of the wage rate or some other job outcome, this assump-
tion is violated. A two stage least squares system of equations overcomes this problem
by generating an instrumental variable to measure the conditional probability of being
a union member that is independent of the effects of the union on wages. This instru-
mental variable is then entered into the second stage of the model and provides the
estimate of the union effect.
There are other technical problems encountered in using two stage least squares with
a zero/one variable. To deal with these one would prefer to use a complex logit or
probit technique. The programs needed to employ these complex techniques were not
available at Cornell at the time this study was undertaken. Several studies have shown,
however, that the least squares estimates closely approximate the results of these more
complex analyses so that this should not be viewed as a major limitation (see Gunderson,
1974; Borjas, 1978)
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Three major arguments have been put forward to justify the use of a two
stage model. The first, and the most misguided of the three, is that
individuals choose their union or nonunion status and, therefore, the probability
of an individual being a union member should be modeled as an individual choice
process. This leads to a model where unionization is dependent on the wages paid
in union jobs or alternatively, the union-nonunion differential an individual
should expect. For example, a recent study adopting this approach is based on
the premise that:
the probability of unionism is not affected by the actual level of
earnings or by the level of earnings in the absence of a union, but
rather by the difference between earnings without a union and earnings
resulting from unionization which is assumed to affect the
probability of unionism (Schmidt, 1978: 454).
While this may be a reasonable proposition for a model of the propensity of
unorganized workers to vote for unions in a representative election (Farber and
Saks, 1980: Kochan, 1979; Getman, Goldberg, and Herman, 1976: Schreisheim,
1978; Hamner and Smith, 1978), it totally ignores the reality that most of the
private sector jobs that are currently unionized have been unionized for some
time. Therefore, job applicants do not make individual choices as to whether to
be unionized or not. Instead, the presence or absence of a union is a fixed
characteristic of the jobs available to workers searching for employment. Any
analysis, therefore, that tries to use a theory of individual choice behavior to
model the probability of being a union member in cross sectional data starts from
an erroneous view of reality. Estimates of the effects of unions on wages (or
other outcomes) that use this approach should be treated with a great deal of
skepticism, especially if the sample is primarily composed of "old" union jobs.
Only if the union is of recent origin such that (1) the same individuals who
voted for unionization remain on the jobs included in the sample, and (2) some of
the preunion conditions that motivated the workers to unionize are still present,
e.g., low wages, poor working conditions, etc., can this specification be justified
on the individual choice premise. While these two conditions may fit a large
17
number of public sector union members, they are not likely to be valid for the vast
majority of private sector union members, since the majority of jobs held by these
workers were unionized between 1930 and 1960,
The second proposition that has been used to defend the two stage
estimation models is somewhat more theoretically defensible, however, it yields
opposite predictions from the individual choice model. This proposition is
labeled the "employer selection hypothesis." It is consistent with the theoretical
proposition developed in this paper that employers adapt to unions over time by
selecting higher quality workers. Unionized employers are able to do so because
they are paying a wage premium. Those using the two stage estimation techniques
then extend this proposition to arque that because of this employer selection
effect, the probability of being unionized (more particularly, being selected
into a unionized firm) is dependent on one's human ci;tal characteristics. Another
way of putting this is that workers queue up for union obs because they pay higher
wages and benefits.
While this proposition can be sensibly applied to the probability of being
hired into a unionized firm,it looses much of its validity as we consider the
effects of unions on promotional opportunities within an organization. Here the
effects of seniority provisions in union contracts mu De taken into consideration.
The more seniority governs access to higher level jobs within unionized firms, the
less individual differences in education,motivation, performance, etc. are likely
to play in gaining access to higher paying positions. This implies that, once
hired, workers with the least favorable alternatives in the external labor market
are likely to stay within a unionized firm while the "most productive" workers
with the greatest human capital (and those least likely to encounter
discrimination in the labor market) and, therefore, with the most favorable
opportunities in the external labor market, are more likely to leave unionized firms.
IY_Llnl_·I_______
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If this proposition is correct, and there is some evidence to suggest that
it is (see Duncan, 1978; Lee, 1978 and the empirical results to follow on the
determinants of the probability of leaving), then the employer selection hypothesis
looses some, but perhaps not all, of its theoretical appeal.
The final argument that has been presented to justify treating union
membership as an endogenous variable is the most difficult one to evaluate on
theoretical or empirical grounds. This argument is that union membership
depends on the determinants of the supply of union organizing efforts. It
states that to the extent that unions have stronger incentives to organize high
wage rather than low wage industries, jobs, or employers, treating membership as
an exogenous variable will overstate the union effect because part of the observed
wage differential existed prior to unionization (Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1972).
Alternatively, to the extent that unions organize jobs with the most objective
safety and health hazards or the most unpleasant working conditions, etc.,
treating membership as exogenous will underestimate their effects on these
conditions of employment. To the extent that these types of jobs paid a
compensating wage differential prior to union organization treating membership
as an exogenous variable will overestimate the effects of union on wages (Duncan
and Stafford, 1980). If, however, the union itself is responsible for obtaining
the compensating wage differential, it may be appropriate to treat membership as
an exogenous variable.
Unfortunately, we lack a good theory or empirical evidence to evaluate the
supply of union services hypothesis. If either a high wage or a low wage bias is
introduced into the analysis because of union organizing selectivity, the bias
would be more of a problem in aggregate, (i.e., industry or occupational level)
studies than in micro studies that use individual union and nonunion workers
scattered across and within industries. This potential bias can also be reduced
by eliminating from the sample individuals whose occupational characteristics
effectively put them outside the domain of union activity, e.g., managers,
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self-employed, high level administrators, and other salaried professionals
in occupations where unions have made few inroads. The more homogeneous
the occupational and industry characteristics of the sample and the more
industry
intra-occupational and intra- variation in union status contained in the
sample, the less subject the analysis will be to this potential bias.
A variant on this proposition strays into the propensity to unionize
territory again. Duncan and Stafford (1980), for example, argue that
unpleasant working conditions, interdependent technologies, and structured work
environments increase the propensity of individuals to unionize and reduce
employer resistance to unions. Because these job characteristics should have
been producing a compensatinq wage differential prior to unionization, part of
the observed union wage differential should be attributable to the unpleasant
nature of the union jobs. This argument is less theoretically appealing for
two reasons. While it is true that unpleasant working conditions are part of
the motivation of workers to unionize, they are no more, perhaps less,
important than low wages (Farber and Saks, 1980) or dissatisfaction with
wages and fringe benefits (Kochan, 1979). Furthermore, there is no historical
evidence to support the contention that employers with interdependent
technologies were any less resistant to unionization than employers with
technologies in which each worker performed relatively independent tasks. The
mass production industries such as steel, autos, rubber, chemicals, cement,
oil, etc., would appear to fall into the interdependent technology category.
These industries were largely organized by mass sit downstrikes and other
exercises of union pressure in the 1930's. To argue that these employers were
less resistant to union initiatives during the mass organizing drives of this
earlier time period is inconsistent with the istc ricl record. Thero i- also
no evidence that employers with these characteristics are currently more amenable
than others to organizing. Instead, all employers that are unorganized appear
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to place a high priority on remaining nonunion (Kochan, 1980; Freedman, 1979)
and the large manufacturing industries with interdependent technologies,
unpleasant working conditions, and structured work environments do not appear
to be an exception to this generalization.
In summary, an evaluation of the theoretical foundation underlying the
view that unions should be treated as an endogenous variable suggests that
(1) the individual choice hypothesis can be dismissed, except in the case of
new union organizing, (2) the employer selection hypothesis may be valid
for the initial hiring decision but is offset by the effects of unions on
promotional opportunities within a firm, and (3) the supply of union services
hypothesis is more difficult to resolve on theoretical grounds. Even this
latter issue is more important when studying union effects at an aggregate level
of analysis than when the unit of analysis is the individual worker.
Furthermore, both the individual choice and the supply of union services
hypotheses appear to be most valid for newly or very recently organized workers
such as public employees.
Thus, all of the theoretical arguments put forth for treating unions as
endogenous are found to be theoretically wanting when applied to studies of
predominantly private sector individuals in jobs that have been unionized for
some time. Even if one believes that there is some theoretical merit to each
of the three arguments, their effects should be offsetting and, therefore,
the direction of the hypothesis or their net effect is unclear. This further
argues against experimenting with more complex models since whatever result is
obtained can be justified or rationalized as being consistent with one of these
arguments. Finally, any measurement error in the variables or any error due to
misspecification of the model is compounded by adding additional stages to an
estimating equation. This especially is true when one of the variables (union
membership) is dichotomous. Thus, partly for technical reasons, but predominantly
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f~r theoretical reasons, treating union membership as an exogenous variable is
still the most appropriate specification for estimating the effects of unions
on wages and other job outcomes.
Interdependence of Job Outcomes
Another factor influencing the choice of an estimating model is the
interdependence of the outcomes of a job that a union is expected to affect
directly or indirectly. This is where the theory outlined in the previous
section plays its most important role in specifying the appropriate estimating
equation. Specifically, the estimation technique should be consistent with
the sequential propositions discussed earlier, namely, (1) the first effect of
unions is to increase wages, (2) unions then will increase fringe benefits both
indirectly through the roll up effects of wages and directly by expanding the
range of benefits available and improving the level of benefits, (3) the
effect of unions on workinq conditions depends on the outcome of the adjustments
that employers make to increased wage and fringe benefit costs and the power
of the union to overcome the employer efforts to compensate by reducing expendi-
tures in this area.
The choice of estimating techniques include (1) treating each outcome
as independent of the others by using ordinary least squares regression equations
for each outcome, (2) treating the outcomes as simultaneously determined in a
system of equations, (3) treating the outcomes as a recursive system in which
the initial effect is on wages and the remaining effects are a function of
exogenous variables and wages. Our theory suggests the effects of unions on
wages, benefits, and working conditions can be treated as a "block recursive"
system, i.e., wages are causally prior to fringe benefits and wages and fringe
benefits together are causally prior to working conditions. All of these primary
lauaai-··----a-rrr----l-------- -----------
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effects are then causally prior to the effects of unions on the more behavioral
aspects of workers' jobs. The specific term of the contract or objective job
outcome that should be treated as the path by which the union influences
the behavioral or psychological aspects of the job may vary from one behavioral
dimension to another. For example, the effects of unions on job stress may depend
most on working conditions or on the design of the job. The effects of the
union on satisfaction with wages obviously is most influenced by the effects
of unions on the actual wages, etc.
It is recognized that the preference for ordinary least squares and the
recursive system that the above discussion implies is not consistent with
recent trends in the literature on the effects of unions. Therefore, two
stage solutions and other reasonable alternatives to the theoretically preferred
specification will be presented in this paper wherever it is feasible to do so.
This will illustrate how sensitive results from these types of studies are to
different specifications and will also provide information on the direction of
bias that is present in our results, if our theory is misguided. However, where
differences are found between the results of two or more different estimating
models, we will put more weight on the results obtained from the model that is
consistent with our theory.
The Sample
A complete description of the 1977 QES is found in Quinn and Staines (1979).
The analysis in this report is limited to the 624 hourly wage earners in the
sample. Two reasons influenced the decision to limit the analysis to this
subset of the respondents. First, as noted earlier, limiting the analysis to
hourly wage earners eliminates a large number of managerial, professional, and
other white collar nonunion employees. These groups tend to have higher salaries
and better fringe benefits, more pleasant working conditions, more autonomy and
flexibility in decisions affecting their jobs and work hours, lower exposures to
III
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job hazards, and higher levels of job satisfaction. Since many (but not all)
of these workers lie outside of the potential domain of union organizing, a more
,',,,.tl l' ,:oit r,l ,'r,)t, f r')r,l)uri,,ri work-rc is obtaiirned y xcluding them.
A second reason for excluding salaried workers is that it is difficult to
construct a reliable measure of hourly wages from the annual income reported
in the survey. Conversely, it is difficult to construct a reliable measure
of annual income from the hourly wage data without making a number of
questionable assumptions about the number of hours and weeks worked per year.
Wages
Wages serve as the starting point for the analysis of the effects of
unions on job outcomes. Numerous studies have shown that unions significantly
increase the wages of their members above the wages of comparable nonunion
workers. Although the size of the union differential varies considerabiy from
study to study, there seems to be a convergence of estimates within the 15 to 20
percent range (Ashenfelter, 1976; Bloch and Kuskin, 1978). Those who have
employed two stage estimation techniques, however, generally have found smaller,
and often insignificant union effects on wages. The results of the analysis per-
formed on these data are presented in Tables 1 and 2. The discussion starts with
the preferred model, i.e., the OLS estimates. Equations present the results for
the pooled sample and the union and nonunion samples separately in order to
determine whether the structure of coefficients vary significantly between union
and nonunion equations. The results of the more complex two-stage models in which
unionism is treated as an endogenous variable are then presented.
The coefficient on the union variable in the OLS equation produce estimates
of approximately a 20 to 22 percent increase in the hourly wage rate associated
A description of each of the measures used in the analysis, along with their
means aid standard deviations are available from the authors upon request.
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TABLE 1
OLS Wage Equations
(Standard Errors io Prenthesis)
Pooled Smple Split SampleIndependent
Variable Union Nonunion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Intercept
Sex
Race
Union Cont.
Age
Education
Trade School
Work Exper.
Industry Inj
North Cent.
Southern
Western
Occupation
Secondary
Suburb
Small City
Rural
Mid-Size
Firm
Large Firm
Huge Fir%
Autonomy
D.O.T. Score
* **
.35
(.14)
.30
(.03)
-.06
(.04)
.21
(.03)
.01
(.01)
.***
.06
(,01)
.05
(.02)
.01
(.01)
.12
(.02)
.13
(.04)
.03
(.04)
.16
(.05)
-.10
(.03)
-.18
(.u3j
.08
(.07)
.01
(.06)
-.06
(.07)
.01
(.06)
.02
(.05)
.07
(.04)
.21 .55
(.15) (.14)
** * ***
.28 .29
(.03) (.03)
-.06 04 -
(.OL! (.04)
*** ***
.22 .22
(.03) (.03)
.01 .01
(.Cl) (.01)
*** ***
.06 .06
(.01) (.01)
*** ***
.05 .04
(.02) (.02)
*** ***
.01 .01
(,0) (.01)
.12 .12
(.02) (.02,
.12 .11
(.04) (.04)
.02 .01
(.04) (.04)
*** ***
.16 .15
(.05) (.05)
*** **
-.09 -.07
(.03) (.03)
*** ***
-.19 -.18 -
(.03) (.03)
.08 .07
(.07) (.07)
.01 .02 -
(.06) (.06)
-.06 -.05 -
(.07) (.07)
.01 .01 -
(.04) (.03)
.02 .03 -
(.05) (.05)
* **
.07 .09 -
(.04) (.04)
.08
(.03)
-.01
(.01)
.30
(.24)
**
.31
(.05)
**
.21
(.06)
.01
(.01)
**
.04
(.02)
.05
**
.0 1
**
,17
(.04)
.24
(.6)
**
.15
(.07)
.26
(.08)
.01
(.07)
(.06)
.04
(.09)
.02
(.08)
.11
(.08)
.04
(.06)
.08
(.07)
,05
(06)
04
(.05)
.47
(.24)
* **
.31
(.05)
* **
-. 19
(.06)
.01
(01)
.04
(.02)
.05
(.02)
.01
( .01)
.18
(.04)
.25
(.06)
**
.15
(.07)
.26
(.07)
.01
(.07)
-.15
(.06)
.03
(.09)
.001
(.08)
-.11
(.08)
-.04
(.06)
-.07
(.07)
-.04
(.06)
-.01
(.01( .0)
*
*
.28
(.21)
.28
(.04)
.03
(.05)
.74
(.19)
.31
(.04)
.03
(.05)
.01 .01
(.01) (.01)
.07 .07
(.01) (.01)
.03 .03
(.02) (.02)
* *** ***
.01 .01
(.01) (.01)
.09 .09
(.03) (.03)
.06 .04
(.05) (.15)
-.01 -.02
(.05) (.05)
.13 .10
(.06) (.06)
-.11 -.08
(.04) (.04)
-.19 -.17
(.04) (.04)
.01 .01
(.12) (.12)
-.06 -.04
(.12) (.11)
-.13 -.09
(.12) (.12)
.03 .03
(.05) (.05)
.09 .09
(.07) (.07)
.20 .21
(.06) (.06)
(.04)
-.02
(.01)
.61 .62 .63 .55 .55 .49 .52
F 41.06 39.80 41.50 11.45 11.63 15.55 16.93
n 518 518 518 196 196 322 322
* - mlgnificant at .10
** a snlflc.nlt at .OS
*** - signitlcaJ t at .01
R2
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with union coverage. These estimates fall within the upper end of the range
of estimates obtained in recent studies. The union coefficients do not
change appreciably when a variety of potential compensating differentials
are added to the equation. Among those added to this pooled equation were
measures of the injury severity in the industry (work days lost), degree of
autonomy the worker perceives on the job, and the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles (DOT) score of measuring the value of the functions of the job in
relation to its work with people, data, and things. When interactions between
union membership and these terms were included in the equation, however, the
union coefficient tended to become unstable and the interactions were sometimes
significant. This suggested the need to split the data into a union and
nonunion sample in order to see whether the effects of these variables differ
significantly across the two sectors.
The overall structure of the coefficients differed significantly between
the union and nonunion samples. Comparison of specific coefficients shows
that there is (1) a significantly higher compensating differential associated
with time lost due to injuries inthe union sector6 (2) significantly less of
a positive differential associated with job autonomy in the union sector, and
(3) significantly less of a negative differential associated with a low ranking
on the DOT measure of job skill in the union sector.
The higher compensating differential for injuries observed in the union
sector is especially important for those who are concerned that OLS wage
5One possible reason for the larger estimates obtained here is that the
sample consists entirely of hourly wage earners. This eliminates more salaried
professionals and other white collar workers who generally have
higher wages and lower rates of unionization. Previous studies have shown that
the effects of unions on the wages of these occupations are considerably less
than that of blue collar workers (Bloch and Kuskin, 1978).
6Additional analysis performed by Robert S. Smith showed that the compensating
differential for the risk of death was also significantly greater in the
union sector but there was no significant differential when the injury rate
was used. These results are consistent with a recent paper by Olson (1979).
__^_1_____1__1_ __
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equations overstate the effects of unions because part of the union
differential may be due to a compensating differential. This point is stressed
in a recent paper by Duncan and Stafford (1980). The finding that there is a
larger differential in the union sector suggests that part of the
differential may in fact be caused by the presence of a union.
The differences observed between the union and nonunion samples on the
autonomy and DOT index are consistent with the argument and evidence that
unions compress the wage structure by raising the wages of jobs at the lower
ends of the job structure and limiting the wages at the higher ends. In
other words, unions increase wages on unskilled jobs but limit the rewards
associated with jobs that involve a higher degree of discretion and
independent judgement.
The results of the two stage least square equations are shown in
Table 2. Several different specifications of the wage and union membership
equations were examined, however, the consistent results obtained were
that (1) the coefficient on the instrumental variable in the wage equation
measuring the probability of being unionized increased in magnitude to
between 28 and 31 percent. The standard error on the variable consistently
increases as well, however, so that the coefficient did not reach the
conventional significance levels./ (The t ratios tended to fall in a range of
between 1.15 and 1.48). The instrumental wage variable in the union
equation was consistently positive and significant.
7 It should be noted that since OLS produces minimum variance estimations an
instrumental variable estimator will always have a greater variance. In any
event, t statistics for the coefficient in the second stage of these
equations should only be viewed as general approximations of the true level
of significance of these coefficients.
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Importance of Fringe Benefits
The theory outlined in section one of this paper argued that union members
would place a higher value on the nonwage aspects of their jobs than would
comparable nonunion members. Part of this differential is due to the wage
effects of unions. This proposition was tested using a question that asked
respondents whether they would be willing to forego a 10 percent wage increase
for improvements in a list of 11 alternative terms and conditions of
employment. The percentage of issues for which the respondent was willing
to forego a 10 percent increase was computed. This percentage serves as an
overall willingness to trade-off wages for improvements in nonwage benefits.
In addition, three subindices were calculated to examine the willingness to
tradeoff wages for (1) economic fringe benefits (e.g., health insurance,
pensions, holidays, etc.), (2) working conditions (e.g., safety and health
improvements, less hard work, etc.), and (3) quality of work improvements
(e.g., more interesting work, more control over work decision, etc.). The
results of these analyses are shown in Table 3. The estimating equation also
included controls for hourly wage rate, demographic characteristics, two
measures of perceived exposure to job hazards, and a measure of mental and
physical strain the worker reported to be under.
The results for the overall equation show that union membership significantly
increases the willingness to trade off a wage increase for improvements in these
nonwage aspects of the job. In addition, positive coefficients are found,
as expected, for wages, exposure to job hazards, and mental/physical strain.
The union coefficient is positive but no longer significant when the fringe
benefits subindex serves as the dependent variable. The effect of higher wages
dominates this equation. Older workers, as might be expected, also indicate a
significantly stronger preference for improving fringe benefits than their
younger counterparts. The union coefficient in the working conditions equation
______1_ 111___1_11_1111__I_.
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is again positive but insignificant. The effects of being exposed to job
hazards dominates this equation. Workers who report more mental and physical
strain, higher wages, and less formal education and training also indicate a
stronger preference for improved working conditions. Union members again
indicate a slightly higher but insignificant preference for improving the quality
of work aspects of their jobs. The most important determinant of the preference
for improving the quality of work is age--younger workers show a stronger
preference for this aspect of this tradeoff than do older workers. Again,
workers with higher degrees of exposure to job hazards also report a stronger
preference for improving the quality of work.
Fringe Benefits
Unions can be expected to increase both the range of fringe benefits
available to workers and the level of benefits provided within each fringe
category (or the costs of the benefits). The data from the QES only allow
us to examine the effects of unions on availability,,since the level of the
benefits was not ascertained.
The central theoretical proposition outlined earlier and tested here is
that unions increase fringe benefits (1) directly because of their members'
interest in fringes and their ability to exert power in collective bargaining,
and (2) indirectly through the roll up effects of wages. The model used to
estimate these direct and indirect effects is an OLS equation that controls
for wage level (see Table 4). The total union effect is computed as the sum of
the regression coefficient in this equation plus the product of the wage
coefficient and the union coefficient in the wage equation. Tables 1 and 4
show that the union coefficient is .21 and the wage coefficient is .12. The
total union effect on the availability of fringes therefore is .052. Evaluated
at the mean of the dependent variable, this total effect implies that compared
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TABILE 3
Willingness to Tradeoff Wage
Increase for Improvement in:
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Independent
Variable
Total Working
Benefits Conditions
Fringe Quality
Benefits of Work
Intercept
Ln(Hourly
Wage)
Head of
Household
Union Contract
Age
Ecucation
Trade School
Sex
Industry
Injury
Severity of
Job Dangers
Personal
Injury
Physical
Condition
F
.01
(.01)
.09
(.02)
-.01
('.01)
.04
(.02)
.14
8.34
.01 -. 01
(. 01) . O1)
.14 .04
(.02) '(.02)
.01 -.01
(.01) (.01)
.06 .07
(.02) (.10)
.20 .10
12.14 5.42
* significant at
**.- significant at
*** - ignificant at
n - 553
.10
.01
(.01)
-.02
(.03)
.05
(.02)
-.01
(.01)
-. 01
(.01)
-.02
(.01)
-. 01
(.03)
-.09
**
.01
(.01)
-.01
(.03)
.04
(.03)
.01
(.01)
-.03
(.01)
-.03
(.01)
-.03
(.03)
.10
.01
(.01)
-.05
(.04)
.04
(.03)
.01
(.01)
-.01
(.01)
-.01
(.01)
.02
(.04)
.27
-. 01
(.01)
-. 01
(.04)
.05
(.03)
-. 01
(.01)
.02
(.01)
-. 01
(.01)
.01
(.04)
.01
(.01)
.07
(.02)
-. 01
(.01)
.02
(.08)
.08
4.55
.10
.05
.01
~--"-slI-----
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to the average nonunion worker, the average union member has approximately
a 14 percent higher probability of receiving the fringe benefits examined
here. Treating each fringe as a separate dependent variable showed that
union membership significantly increases the probability of receiving
the following fringes: medical insurance, life insurance, pensions,
dental insurance, eyeglass benefits, and thrift or savings programs. Union
membership reduces the probability of being covered by a profit sharing
plan. Two alternative specifications of equations estimating the effects
of unions on fringes could be considered. The first alternative would be
to treat unions as endogenous by using an instrumental variable to capture
the union effect. The second alternative would be to treat the union as
exogenous. The union variable in the fringe and wage equations is the same
as in our OLS model. It is not an instrumental variable. The results
of the two stage least squares fringe model analyses are presented in Table
5. Both the wage coefficient in the fringe equation and the union co-
efficient in the wage equation are positive. These results do not support
the hypothesis that a tradeoff exists between the range of fringe benefits
offered a worker and the wage rate of hourly wage earners. The positive
coefficients might be interpreted as being consistent with either a positive
goods or a union power explanation. In any event, these results should
be interpreted with care for two reasons. First, all of the technical
problems associated with the two-stage equations for estimating union effects
are also present in these equations. Second, to provide an adequate test
of the compensating differential hypothesis the value of the fringe benefits
being offered (or the cost to the employer) should be measured in addition
to the availability of the benefits.
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TABLE 4
Fringe Benefits Available
(Standard Errors in ParenLhcses)
Independent Full OLS OLS Model Excluding
Variable Model Wage Level
Intercept .17
(.07)
.04
(.02)
Sex
Race
Union Contract
Age
Education
-.01
(.02)
.03
(.02)
** *
-.01
(.01)
.01
(.01)
.21
(.07)
.08**
(.02)
-.02
(.02)
* **
.05
(.02)
-.01
(.01)
.02
(.01)
Trade School
Work Experience
Industry Injury
North Central
Southern
Western
Occupation
Secondary
Industry
Suburb
Small City
Rural
Mid-Size Firm
Large Firm
Huge Firm
Ln(Hourly Wage)
F
* - significant at .10
** - significant at .05
*** significant at .01
.01
(.01)
.01
(.01)
-.01
(.01)
-.01
(.02)
.02
(.02)
.05
(.03)
-.04
(.02)
.02
(.02)
.01
(.04)
.01
(.03)
-.02
(.03)
.05
(.02)
12***
(.02)
16**
(.02)
34
12.66
n - 485
-.01
(.01)
.01
(.01)
-.02
(.01)
- .01
(.02)
.02
(.02)
.03
(.03)
-.02
(.02)
.04**
(.02)
-.01
(.03)
.01
(.03)
-. 01
(.03)
.06
(.02)
.12
(.02)
·15**
.15
(.02)
.12
(.02)
.38
13.99
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Occupational Injuries
Efforts to estimate the effects of union membership on the rate
of injuries from these data were generally unsuccessful. The respondents
were asked to indicate the number of days they had lost due to job related
injuries or illnesses in the past year. Regression equations that used
this measure as a dependent variable failed to produce accurate predictions
(the OLS equation had an F value of only 1.65) or explain more than 6
percent of the variance. OLS and two-stage equations are presented in
Table 6. The union coefficients are not significant in either equation,
although the sign changes from negative to positive in moving from the OLS
equation to the two stage equation that uses an instrumental variable to
calculate the probability of being a union member. Again, however, neither
of these equations has sufficient predictive or explanatory power to
take seriously.
Exposure to Job Hazards
In addition to data on personal injuries, respondents were asked
to indicate whether or not they are exposed to a number of job hazards and if
so, the extent to which these hazards presented serious problems to them.
The results of OLS and two stage least squares equations (see Table 7)
both show that union members report more problems with job hazards than
comparable nonunion workers. This is true even after controlling for the
average injury rate in the industry. This result also holds up in a two
stage system which shouldbe adjusting for the fact that unions are more
likely to organize hazardous industries and jobs.
These results can be interpreted in one of two ways. If these
workers perceptions reflect reality, then union members are exposed to more
job hazards, and even after controlling for the location effect of union
TA LE 5
Two StaLe Least quares
Fringe Benefit Systcr s
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Union Variable:
Independent
Variable
Intercept
Sex
Race
Union
Contract
Endogenous
Fringes Ln(Hourly
Available Wage)
.12 .29**
(.10) (.12)
.01 .28
(.03) (.04)
.01 -.07
(.02) (.04)
Fringes
,Availabl
.28
(.07)
.02
(.02)
-. 01
(.02)
.01
(.02)
Exogenous
Ln(Hourly
e Wage)
.28
(.12)
.29 ***
(.03)
-.06*
(.04)
.20***
(.03)
Union Cont.
Instrument
Age
Education
Trade School
Work
Experience
Industry
Injury
North Cent.
.20**
(.08)
-. 01
(.01 )
-. 01
(.01)
-.03
(.02)
Southern
Western
Secondary
Industry
Mid-Size .08
Firm (.02)
Large Firm .15
(.03)
Huge Firm .19
(.03)
Ln(Hourly .28
Wage) Inst. (.07)
D.O.T. Score .01
(.01)
* -significant at .10
** - significant at .05
*** significant at .01
n - 485
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.30
(.25)
. 01*
(.01)
.07**
(.01)
.05***
(.02)
.01
(.01)
.11 **
(.03)
.10*
(.05)
.02
(.05)
.15**
(.06)
-. 11
(.05)
-.03
(.06)
-.02
(.07)
.04
(.09)
.01*
(.01)
. 07***
(.01)
.06***
(.02)
.01**
(.01)
.11***
(.02)
.11***
(.04)
.01
(.04)
.17***
(.05)
-.13**
(.03)
-.02
(.04)
.05)
.07
(.04)
-. 01
(.01)
.01 *
(.01)
-.04
(.01)
. 05***
(.02)
***
.11
(.02)
(.02)
.17***
(.06)
.01
(.01)
---
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TABLE 6
Personal Injury
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Independent OLS 2STS
Variable Personal Injury Personal Ln(Hourly
Injury Wage)
Intercept
Sex
Race
-5.41
(6.27)
.69
(2.08)
-1.52
(2.48)
Union Contract
-2.35
(6.86)
-.63
(2.38)
-1.55
(2.53)
**
.30
(.13)
.29
(.06)
-.06
(.04)
-.11
(2.15)
Union Contract
Instrument
Age
Education
Trade School
Work Experience
Industry Injury
North Central
Southern
Western
Secondary Industry
Mid-Size Firm
Large Firm
Huge Firm
D.O.T. Score
F
* - significant at
** - significant at
*** - ignifJcant at
7.98
(6.81)
-.06
(.08)
.06
(.06)
2.46
(1.44)
.11
(2.32)
-1.87
(3.23)
-.49
(2.70)
-.12
(.22)
-.05
(.08)
.01
(.08)
1.75
(1.57)
-1.40
(2.66)
-4.18
(3.76)
-3.63
(3.71)
.36
(.37)
.01
(.01)
** *
.07
(.01)
**
.05
(.02)
.01
(.01)
.10
(.03)
.09
(.06)
.01
(.06)
.13
(.07)
-. 11
(.07)
-.03
(.08)
-.03
(.11)
.02
(.13)
-.12
(.22)
.0149
.722
489
.10
.05
.01
518
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jobs through the two stage procedure, there is no evidence that on
average unions have reduced exposures to job hazards. Another interpre-
tation might be that unions make their members more aware of the hazards
found on their jobs and raise the consciousness of workers about the
problems these hazards pose. Unfortunately, there is no clear way of
determining which of these is the most accurate interpretation of these
,findings.
Voluntary Turnover
The evidence from several recent studies suggest that unions signifi-
cantly reduce the probability that a worker will voluntarily quit his or
her job (Freeman 1976; Farber 1979). Two potential explanations have been
offered to explain why this is the case, both of which implicitly draw on
the propositions offered more than two decades ago in the March and Simon
(1958) turnover model. One is that unions increase wages and improve
other terms of the employment contract and thereby increase the value of
the job to the worker over the value of potential alternative jobs in the
external labor market. March and Simon (1958) referred to this type of
effect as reducing the ease of leaving an organization. This effect should
be especially strong for high seniority workers, for workers with few marketa-
ble skills, or for workers most susceptible to discrimination in the labor
market. While there is little question that this explanation provides
at least part of the explanation for the empirical findings, Freeman argues
that even after controlling for the economic effects of union membership
the probability that union members will quit is still lower. This led him
to suggest an "exit-voice" hypothesis for explaining this finding. The
argument is that unionism and collective bargaining provide workers with alter-
native mechanisms for voicing dissatisfaction on the job. These mechanisms
1. I CI _ _____
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TABLE 7
Job Dangers
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Independent OLS 2SLS
Variable Job Dangers Job Dangers Ln(I1rly Wg)
Intercept 1.08
(.20)
.23
(.06)
Sex
Race
Union Contract
.11
(.08)
.22
(.07)
1.28
(.23)
**
.15
(.08)
.10
(.08)
**(.29)
. 29
(.04)
- .06
(.04)
Union Contract
Instrument
Age
Education
Trade School
Work Experience
Industry Injury
North Central
Southern
Western
Secondary Industry
Mid-Size Firm
Large Firm
Huge Firm
D.O.T. Score
F
n
* = significant at .10
** -,significant at .05
*** - significant at .01
.70
(.22)
**
-.01 --
(.01 )
-. 01
(.01) 
.08
(.05)
.01
(.09)
-.27
(.12)
.03
(.12)
.29
(.24)
.01
(.01)
.07
(.01)
***
.05
(.02)
.01
(.01)
.10
(.03)
. 11**
(. 05)
.01
(.05)
**
.15
(.06)
-. 13
(.05)
-.01
( .06)
-. 01
(.08)
.05
(.09)
-.01
(.01)
.01
(.01)
.13
(. 05)
.10
(.07)
-. 15
(.10)
.2 .
(. 08)
-. 01
(. 01)
.1705
10.55
524
-.01
(.01)
518
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provide an alternative to leaving when workers experience job dissatisfaction.
March and Simon refer to factors that hold workers to their jobs by reducing
the desirability of leaving the organization. Most empirical studies test
this part o the March and Simon model by relating job satisfaction to
8
turnover.
Two questions were asked of the respondents that allow us to explore
the strength of these two explanations for what holds union members to their
jobs more strongly than nonunion members. One question asked respondents
how likely it was that they would leave their organization in the next
year. To test whether the exit-voice argument plays a role in the decision
to stay on the job, the effects of job dissatisfaction on the propensity
to leave the organization can be compared in the union and nonunion sectors.
If the voice effect is operating, job dissatisfaction should be less
closely associated with propensity to leave in the union than the non-
union sector.
The second question asked respondents how easy it would be to replace
their job in the external labor market with one of equivalent value.
This latter question provides a relatively straightforward test of strength
of the "ease of leaving" explanation for lower propensity of union members
to quit their jobs. We would expect, therefore, that union membership is
negatively associated with the ease of replacing one's job on the external
market and that this effect is strongest for unionized workers who have
higher seniority, lower education, and are nonwhite.
The results of the regression equations used to analyze the propensity
A third interpretation of the association between union membership and turn-
over has recently been offered to justify the use of a two stage estimation
system. The argument is that employees with low turnover propensities
are selected into union jobs. The results of the OLS equations discussed
below are checked by estimating a two stage system using an instrumental
variable to measure the probability of being unionized. No significant
differences from the OLS results were obtained.
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to leave are shown in Table 8. OLS equations were run for the propensity
to leave equation controlling for wage level, experience, education and
training, age, sex, race, and job satisfaction. After controlling for these
variables union membership has a negative but insignificant effect on the
propensity to leave. The coefficients on the wage, seniority, age, and
job satisfaction variables have the expected sign and are highly significant.
Race, sex, and education are not significant in this equation. Thus,
aftercontrolling for the wage effects and for job satisfaction, union
membership does not significantly affect the propensity to leave. When wage
rate is dropped from the equation, however, the union coefficient is negative
and highly significant. 9
Splitting the sample into its union and nonunion components, however,
provides a more appropriate test of the voice hypothesis. These results
are also presented in Table 8. The structure of coefficients for the union
and nonunion sample differ significantly (F=3.68; p.<.01). The major
differences in the individual coefficients indicate job dissatisfaction
exerts twice as strong an effect on the propensity to quit of nonunion
workers as union members. This is consistent with the voice hypothesis.
In addition, the coefficient on seniority is slightly larger for the
union members indicating that the tendency for high seniority union members
to remain on their job is slightly stronger than for high seniority non-
union workers.
The regressions run using the measure of the ease of replacing one's
job as the dependent variable are presented in Table 9. Being a union
9Additional regression runs showed that the availability of fringe benefits
and the perceived ability to replace one's job with one of equivalent
value in the external market also are significatnly related to propensity
to leave in their expected directions (see Table 8).
39TABLE 8
Probability of Leaving Job
OLS Model.
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Independent Total Split Sample
Variable Sample Union Nonunion
Intercept
Sex
Race
Union Contract
Age
Education
Work Experience
Ln(Hourly Wage)
Total Satisfaction
F
n
* a
*** w=· c
,=~S 
significant at
significant at
significant at
1.58
.02
(.04)
.08
(.05)
-. 04
(.04)
-. 01
(.01)
-. 01
(.01)
-. 01
(.01)
-.16
(.05)
-. 21
(.04)
.24
23.83
607
1.17
.02
(.07)
.26
(.08)
-. 01
(.01)
(.
1.83
.01
(.05)
-. 05
(.06)
-. 01
(.01)
01
02)
-. 01
(.01)
-.14
(.08)
-. 11
(.05)
.22
9.41
.02
(.02)
-. 01
(.01)
-.16
(.07)
-. 30
(.05)
.26
18.21
237 368
.10
.05
.01
____ _-
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member has a significant negative relationship with this measure after
controlling for wage rate, age, sex, seniority, race and job dissatisfaction.
Splitting the sample again shows that the structure of the coefficients
differ significantly between union and nonunion workers (F=4.70; p<.01).
High seniority union members again indicate they would expect to have a
harder time finding a job of equivalent value than do the nonunion workers
of comparable seniority. The effects of education also differ between
these two samples. In the union sample, the higher the education, the
easier it is believed to be to obtain a job of comparable value, while
in the nonunion sector education is not significantly related to this
belief. Race again shows a significant difference in the direction contrary
to our expectations. Nonwhite union members are more likely to believe
they could obtain jobs of equivalent value than white union members while
race has no significant effect in the nonunion sample.
The main conclusions that can be drawn from these results are that
most of the variance in the relationship between union membership and pro-
pensity to stay on the job is accounted for by the wage (and perhaps other
economic benefits as well) advantages that union members enjoy. There
is some evidence supporting the exit-voice hypothesis, however, since union
members who are dissatisfied with their jobs are less likely to quit
than dissatisfied nonunion workers.
Job Attitudes
Do unions affect the job attitudes of workers? The evidence to date
on this question is rather mixed. Most of the studies available have
focused on the rather narrow, and somewhat controversial question (Salancik
and Pfeffer, 1977; Hammermesh, 1976) of the relationship between union
41
TABLE 9
Job RePlacability
OLS Model
(Standard Errors in Parenthescs)
Independent Total Split Sample
Variable Sample Union Nonunion
Intercept
Sex
Race
Union Contract
Age
Education
Work Experience
Ln(Hourly Wage)
Total Satisfaction
R2
F
n
* significant at .10
** = significant at .05
*** - significant at .01
.41
.01
(.05)
-. 05
(.05)
-. 23
(.05)
-. 01
(.01)
.03
(.02)
-. 01
(.01)
-. 04
(.06)
.11
(.04)
-.08
.05
(.08)
.61
-. 04
(.06)
-. 14
(.07)
.08
(.09)
-. 01
(.01)
.01
(.01)
**
.06
(.03)
-. 01
(.01)
.01
(.02)
-. 01
(.01)
.02
(.07)
-. 11
(.09)
.18
(.07)
.12 .10
10.31 3.60
605 235
.05
(.05)
.03
1.40
368
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membership and job satisfaction. One study found a significant positive
effect for unions on those facets of the job unions influence most directly,
e.g., pay (Hammer, 1978). Two studies, however, have found negative effects
for unions after controlling for demographic characteristics and wage level
(Freeman, 1978; Borjas, 1979). Both of these studies, however, used a
single item measure of overall job satisfaction. The QES data allow us to
examine the effects of unions on satisfaction with different facets of the
job.
Three sets of analyses were performed on these data. First, the average
using a regression equation controlling for demographic characteristics, region
of the country, firm size, industry, and occupation. Second, the same analysis
was repeated but the hourly wage rate was added as an additional control variable.
Third, within the union sample variations in the ratings of union members' per-
ceptions of their union performance were related to their job satisfaction.
The results of these analyses are summarized in Table 10. On average, unions
have positive and significant effects on members' satisfaction with bread and
butter aspects of their jobs (i.e.,pay, fringes, and job security). Once the wage
level is controlled for (see column two of Table 10), however, the effects of
union membership loses significance. Thus, the average union improves members'
satisfaction with these bread and butter aspects of the job through its effects on
wages. The effects of unions on satisfaction with supervisors, promotion prospects,
job content, the adequacy of resources/information needed to do the job, and job
context were consistently negative. In the case of job content, promotions, and
resource adequacy, the union effect was significant after controlling for wage
level. Thus, while union members are more satisfied with the bread and butter
aspects of their jobs, i.e., on the job dimensions unions have given the most
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attention, they appear to be less satisfied than nonunion workers with the
other dimensions of their jobs.
Additional OLS equations were run by splitting the sample into groups of
workers/age 45 and under and those 46 and older, and (2) those with 10 years
seniority or more and 9 years or less. These splits were motivated by the
recent rather suprising conclusions reached by Borjas (1979) that older union
members are less satisfied with their jobs than younger union members. 1 0 This
finding is clearly inconsistent with the expectations that flow from the
theoretical framework presented in the first section of this paper. We would
expect that because of the increasing economic returns and security that union
members gain from seniority, job satisfaction should be higher among older and
more senior union members than young union members. The results presented in
Table 11 test this hypothesis. As expected, older and higher seniority union
members are more satisfied (or less dissatisfied) compared to nonunion workers
of their seniority and age cohort than are younger and lower seniority union
members relative to nonunion workers in their cohort.
A further check on these results was obtained by using a two stage
equation to adjust for the potential that unions are located in jobs with the
least desirable characteristics. The results did not differ from the OLS results.
The most straightforward interpretation of these results is that unions
have their primary effects on wages and other bread and butter issues and
this carries over to affect members' evaluations of these aspects of their
jobs. Unions have been less successful,however, in making substantive improvements
on these other dimensions of their members' jobs. The negative
10The generalizability of Borjas' conclusion is rather suspect since his sample
was limited to workers between the ages of 52 and 64.
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relationships found with these other dimensions further suggest that employer
adjustments to unionism may produce less favorable job attitudes among
union members. This interpretation is consistent with the model pre-
sented in Figure 1 and with data collected recently on management labor
relations goals and practices (Freedman, 1979; Kochan, 1980).
An alternative interpretation of these results that again draws
on the voice hypothesis has also been suggested in earlier studies.
That is, because unions are an instrument for voicing dissatisfaction on
the job, they raise members' consciousness of the problems associated with
their job environment. Thus, union members may respond more negatively
to job satisfaction questions because of this "voice effect" of trade
unions. This argument does not, however, help explain why the relationship
between union membership and job satisfaction varies across different
dimensions of the job, or across different age and seniority groups.
Relating a measure of union performance to job satisfaction produced
strikingly different results from those discussed above (see columns three
and four of Table 10). Strong positive correlations and regression coeffi-
cients were consistently found between union performance perceptions and
all dimensions of job satisfaction except resource adequacy, even after
controlling for wage level. These results are consistent with those
obtained in another recent study of the relationship between union attitudes
and job satisfaction (Gordon et al., 1979).
It is probably futile to try to sort out which is the cause and which
is the effect in the union performance-job satisfaction relationship. One
interpretation of these findings would be that unions gain some of the credit
for improving workers' jobs and in turn share some of the blame when workers
are dissatisfied. Another stronger causal argument would be that higher
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TABLE 10
Regression Coefficients of Union Mcnmbership and
Union Performance on Facets of Job Satisfaction
(Standard Errors in Parenthesis)l
Membership Performance
Satisfaction Union Controlling Union Controlling
Measure Membership for Wage Performance for Wage
Level Level
Bread & Butter
Promotions
Supervisors
Job Content
Resource
Adequacy
Job Context
.14
(.08)
-. 11
(.09)
-. 13
(.08)
-. 13
(.07)
-. 11
(.06)
-. 15
(.10)
.03
(.08)
-. 17
(.09)
-. 13
(.08)
-. 22
(.07)
**
-. 13
(.06)
-. 17
(.10)
. 55
(.08)
.48
(.09)
.27
(.09)
.20
(.08)
.12
(.07)
**
.29
(.12)
.51
(.08)
.47
(.09)
.27
(.10)
.18
(.08)
.11
(.07)
.31
(.12)
* significant at .10
** significant at .05
*** = significant at .01
1 All regressions were run for hourly wage earners controlling
for demographic characteristics (age, race, sex, seniority,
and education), industry, occupation, region of the country,
size of firm, size of city, and industry injury rate. The
union sample contained 239 observations. The total sample
contained 538 observations.
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levels of union performance produce higher levels of job satisfaction.
Undoubtedly both of these interpretations provide part of the explanation
for these findings. It is less important to sort out the direction of
causality between worker evaluations of the performance of their unions and
their job satisfaction than it is to recognize that the two phenomena
move in parallel directions when union members evaluate their jobs. Thus,
both union and management officials apparently have a stake in paying atten-
tion to worker job attitudes. Furthermore, these results again point out
that the "average"union effect on job outcomes can be rather misleading.
The diversity of union effects is perhaps the more important phenomenon to
understand and appreciate.
It is important to go beyond the issue of job satisfaction in evaluating
the effects of collective bargaining on the psychological outcomes of
workers' jobs. For example, a recent study showed that the combination
of a high degree of job pressure or demands placed on workers, along with
low latitude to make decisions,produces a higher level of mental strain
(a measure of mental health) (Karasek, 1979). Application of this model
to the QES data did not find any significant differences on these job
outcomes between union and nonunion hourly wage earners (see Table 12).
As with the job satisfaction results, however, the perceptions of union
performance were significantly related to each of these measures. Higher
levels of union performance were positively related to degree of job lati-
tude and negatively related to both job pressures or demands and to job
strain. These results only begin to scratch the surface of this important
area. Together with the job satisfaction findings, however, they illus-
trate the need to more systematically study the conditions under which
collective bargaining effects employee attitudes, evaluations of their jobs,
and general psychological well being.
II[
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TABLE 11
Regression Cocfficients of Union
Membership on Facets of Job Satisfaction
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 1
Satisfaction Age Experience
Measure Under 45 45 or Over Up to 10 Yrs. Over 10 Yrs.
Bread and
Butter
Promotions
Supervisors
Job Content
Resource
Adequacy
Job Context
-.04
(.11)
*
-. 22
(.12)
-. 18
(.11)
-. 19
(.09)
-. 15
(.08)
-. 25
(.14)
371
-. 26
(.19)
-. 13
(.21)
.05
(. 18)
-. 14
(.16)
-. 02
(.13)
.08
(.22)
145
-. 14
(.11 )
-. 20
(.12)
-. 18
(.10)
-. 17
(.09)
-. 15
(.07)
-. 22
(.13)
409
-. 10
(. 18)
-. 33
(.21)
-. 01
(.18)
-. 18
(.15)
-. 10
(. 15)
-. 02
(.23)
111
* = significant at .10
** significant at .05
*** = significant at .01
All regressions were run for hourly wage earners controlling
for demographic characteristics (age, race, sex, seniority,
and education) industry, occupation, region of the country,
size of firm, size of city, and the industry injury rate.
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Desire for Participation
Much has been written in recent years about the growing desire
of American workers for gaining greater say or influence over decisions
affecting their jobs. One of the questions in the survey allows us to
examine whether union membership significantly influences the interest
workers express in participating in workplace decisions. We would
expect that union members would be more interested in participation for
two reasons. First, one of the objectives of trade unions is to provide
a mechanism for formally giving workers a voice in the determination of
terms and conditions of employment. Thus, by gaining some experience
in this process indirectly through collective bargaining, union members
are made more aware of their rights to participate and accept these rights
as part of their job experience. Second, to the extent that unions increase
wages, we again would expect workers to assign a higher priority to
the nonwage aspects of their job. Interest in participation may also be
one of the nonwage aspects of the job that union members show a greater
interest in as their wages increase.
A regression equation run to test the effects of union membership
(see Table 13) did find that union membership was positively and signifi-
cantly related to beliefs about the rights of workers to participate in
job related decisions. Similarly, younger workers, and workers with higher
wage rates were also moreinterested in participating than their older and
lower paid counterparts.
Difficulty of Changing Employer Policies
Since one of the functions of a union is to improve the ability of
workers to achieve their job related goals, we might expect that unionized
TABLE 12
Decision Latitude and
Job Demands
OLS MIodel
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Decision Latitude Job Demands
Independent Total Union Total Union
Variable Sample Sample Sample Sample
Intercept
Age
Sex
Race
D.O.T.
Score
Work
Experience
Mid-Size
Firm
Large Firm
Huge Firm
Union
Contract
Union
Performance
2.82
.01
(.01)
.14
(.04)
.02
(.05)
-. 03
(.01)
.01
(.01)
-. 06
(.05)
-. 03
(.07)
-. 10
(.05)
2.51
.01
(. 01)
.12
(.07)
.15
(.09)
-. 03
(.01)
-. 01
(.01)
-. 07
(.08)
. 05
(.11)
-. 07
(.08)
-. 06
(.04)
.13
(.05)
.13
F
n
9.59
595
* significant at
** = significant at
*** significant at
.16
4 .17
205
2.31
.01
(.01)
.01
(.03)
.03
(.04)
-. 01
(.01)
-. 01
(.01)
.02
(.04)
-. 09
(.06)
. **
-. 10
(.05)
.06
(.04)
.04
2.90
595
2.73
.01
(.01)
-. 05
(.06)
.03
(.07)
-. 01
(.01)
.01
(.01)
.01
(.07)
-. 16
(.09)
-. 08
(.07)
-. 10
(.04)
.07
1.64
205
.10
.05
.01
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workers would be in a better position to get their employer to change poli-
cies relating to the terms and conditions of employment than would compar-
able nonunion workers. One set of questions in the survey allowed us to
test this hypothesis. The respondents were asked to rate on a five point
scale how difficult it would be to get their employer to change (1) the
duties performed on the job, (2) the days off provided on the job, and
(3) the hours of work associated with the job. Surprisingly, the results
of a regression equation showed that union membership is negatively,
although not significantly, related to the perceived difficulty of changing
employer policies. One interpretation of this finding is that the formaliza-
tion of employer policies that occurs in response to unions and the nego-
tiation of a collective agreement reduce the ability of individual
workers to influence policies.
Variations Within the Union Sector
This paper has emphasized the average effects of unions on a variety
of job outcomes. As noted at various points, however, in addition to
the results reported here, a series of regression equations were also
computed using the union sample to examine the relationship between
measures of perceived union performance and some of the behavioral job
outcomes such as propensity to leave, job satisfaction, job strain, and
difficulty of changing employer policies. The results of these equations
showed that there is a significant positive relationship between satisfaction
with most facets of the job and union performance, significant negative
relationships between union performance and propensity to leave, exposure
to job hazards, mental strain, and difficulty to change employer policies.
If taken at face value, these results suggest that higher levels of union
performance do produce these job outcomes. Two problems limit our
51
1 ,.. i I t ' . , I. I I , I I " \
(Dt,1 ; a rd rr.)t in i,,, '.t t I;)
I)ndtc I ' I r t , t i l i , .
Inrdependnt 'l'to i U nio n 1t [II Ui i(
Variable Sale Sa,'l.t ,.:21c
Intercept
Sex
Race
Union
Contract
2.40*** 2.63*** 3.8*** 3.3***
(.21) (.44) (.3) .57)
-. 07
(.05)
.1 6
(.06)
.15
(.05)
- .07
(. 1 1 )
.11
(.12)
- . 1.
( . 08)
(.10)
.14
(.OS)
-. 44
(. 4)
.13)
Union
Performance
Age
Education
Trade School
-. 01
(.04)
- .01 -. 01
(.01) (.01)
.01 .01
(.02) (.03)
.05 -. 01
(.02) (.04)
Work .01
Experience (.01)
Industry
I 1 ury
North
Central
Southern
Western
Occupation
Secondary
Industry
Suburban
Small City
Rural
Mid-Size
Firm
Large Firm
Huge Firm
Ln(Hourly
Wage)
.0 2
(.04)
-. 04
(.06)
.03
(.06)
-. 01
(.07)
-. 05
(.05)
.01
(.05)
.03
(.11)
-. 07
(.10)
-. 08
(.10)
-.01
(.05)
-. 04
(.07)
.13
(.06)
-. 03
(.07)
R2 .10
F 2.61
n 518
* - hlgnifcnnt at
** - sIgnlfic.int Jt
*** - ignificant at
-.01
(.01)
-. 05
(.08)
.12
(.12)
.22
( . 13)
.06
(.15)
-. 12
(.13)
-. 05
(.13)
.12
(.16)
-.05
(.15)
-. 10
(.15)
.04
(.10)
-. 17
(.13)
.09
(.10)
.11
(.14)
.10
.88
184
.10
. OS
.01
.Ci '
-. 043(.03)
.02
(.04)
-. 01
(.01)
-. 05
(.06)
-.13
(.10)
-. 11'
(.10)
-.12
(.1 2)
.05
(.08)
- .24
(.08)
0 8
(.17)
-. 04
(.16)
.05
(.16b)
.17
(.09)
.14
(.12)
***
.29
(.10)
-. 05
(.11)
.10
2.80
51 I
.06
(. 5)
.01(.01)
-. 07
(.04)
.03
(.05)
-. 01
(.01)
.05
(.10)
-. 26
(.15)
.117(.17)
-. 30
(.19)
-. 17
(.16)
-. 22
(.17)
.19
(.21)
-. 01
(.19)
.03
(.20)
.04
(.13)
-. 02
(.17)
.23*
(,13)
.01
(.18)
.18
.2
184
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confidence in this interpretation at this point, however. First,
a response consistency bias no doubt runs through these data. For
example, those who are satisfied with their job and so indicate in their
responses may feel compelled to also report higher levels of union per-
formance in order to appear to be giving consistent answers to the questions.
This problem (sometimes referred to as a "common method" bias) is often
encountered when correlating two sets of perceptual data which are
obtained from the same respondents on the same questionnaires at the
same point in time.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper used the data contained in the 1977 QES to assess the
effects of unions and collective bargaining on a variety of job outcomes.
To do so it was first necessary to develop a theoretical framework to guide
the specification of a set of estimation equations. The theory stressed
the sequential nature of the effects of unions on different outcomes.
One of the key propositions in the theory is that the effects of unions
on many of these job outcomes depends on the ways in which employers adjust
One indirect (and only partially satisfactory) precaution was taken in
the analysis to minimize the effects of the response consistency bias.
This was to include a measure of satisfaction with coworkers as a control
variable in equations relating union performance to job attitudes or self
reports of job conditions. The logic behind this approach is that any
positive correlation between union performance and satisfaction with co-
workers is likely to be spurious--an artifact of response consistency.
There is no theoretical reason to expect that union performance should
affect relations among coworkers. Thus, by including satisfaction with
coworkers as a control variable in the job attitudes and other self report
equations, some of the spurious component included in the union performance
measure may be attributed to the coworkers variable. While this technique
is clearly not powerful enough to eliminate the basic problem, it did have
the effect of lowering the size of the union performance coefficient some-
what in all of the equations in which it was entered. If the strategy
worked, then the lower union performance coefficients should more closely
approximate the true effect of this construct than the coefficients obtained
without some control for response consistency in the equation.
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to the presence of a union or to union induced increases in labor costs.
Thus, a complete test of the effects of unions and collective bargaining
on these outcomes requires data on employer behavior as well as on the pre-
sence (or absence) of a union.
Considerable discussion was devoted to the technical issue of whether
it is best to treat union membership as an exogenous or an endogenous
variable in these types of analyses. If viewed in purely technical terms,
this comes down to a choice of whether one believes the bias caused by a
correlated errors problem with theOLS equations is greater than the error
introduced by using a more complicated two stage system,which assesses the
union effect through an instrumental variable measuring the conditional
probability of being unionized, given the other variables in the system.
The seriousness of the correlated errors problem, in turn, depends on how
much importance one attaches to the three arguments that have been advanced
for viewing union membership as endogenous in the system: (1) the individual
choice assumption, (2) the employer selection assumption, and (3) the supply
of union services hypothesis. The decision made in this paper was that
these arguments were not sufficiently compelling to automatically justify
reliance on the two stage models. This view is inconsistent, however,
with the approach taken in most recent studies of union/nonunion differentials.
In any event the more complex formulations that were explored did not
produce any major inconsistencies from the OLS results. Generally, the
12One recent study (which appeared after this paper was completed but before
it went to press) that departs from the trend in the literature and relies
on arguments similar to those used in this paper is Mitchell (1980).
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Implications for Research and Policy Analysis
After a number of years of relatively few developments, the growth
of micro data sets has produced a renaissance in the study of the effects
of trade unions. Researchers are now addressing a far richer array of issues
than the effects of unions on wages. While this renewed and expanded inter-
est is a welcome development, it makes us vividly aware of the difficulty
of doing empirical research in the absence of a well developed theory of
how unions and collective bargaining affect employer behavior, and together,
how they affect job outcomes. The theoretical propositions outlined
in this paper obviously only scratch the surface of the problem. Futher-
more, the implications for analysis that we drew from the propositons are
bound to spark criticism and debate. We do not claim to have resolved all
of the theoretical and technical problems involved in this type of work,
even to our own satisfaction. Hopefully, however, we will encourage others
to present a stronger theoretical argument for the choice of their empirical
specifications so that eventually more consensus will develop around a model
that makes sense in terms of the history and current practice of collective
bargaining and union-management relations.
Having said this, we further believe that studies of the "average"
union/nonunion differential onlv serve as a starting point for analysis
that can be useful for public policy makers and practitioners. The key
information that is needed to guide public policy and private practice is
not the average union effect, but what causes variations in the performance
of unions and employers under collective bargaining. The finding that
unions increase wages is not (and should not) lead policy makers to advocate
eliminating or suppressing unions. Neither should a finding that unions
increase job satisfaction or reduce injuries be sufficient rationale for
advocating the spread of unions to new settings. Instead, what policy
coefficients were in the same direction, with larger standard errors.
The results of the analysis suggest that for hourly wage earners the
direct effects of union membership are to: (1) increase wages, (2) increase
the availability of fringe benefits, (3) produce higher compensating wage
differentials for hazardous work, (4) reduce the wage premium paid for jobs
involving high discretion and/or skills, (5) increase the perceived
value of one's job relative to potential alternative jobs in the external
labor market, (6) increase the amount of say that workers want to have
in decisions affecting their jobs, (7) increase the willngness of workers
to trade off wage increases for improvements in other job conditions,
(8) marginally increase job satisfaction with bread and butter issues and
decrease job satisfaction on other facets of the job, particularly the
content of the job, and (9) marginally reduce the perceived ability to change
employer policies. Although no conclusions could be reached on the effects
of unions on injuries, union members reported being exposed to more
job hazards than comparable nonunion workers. No significant effect for
union membership was found for reports of job latitude or discretion
job demands or pressures, or mental strain.
Unions also have indirect effects on several of the job outcomes
mentioned above through their effects on wages. By raising wages, providing
other economic benefits, and perhaps by providing alternative outlets for
job dissatisfaction, for example, unions reduce turnover. It was also
found that compared to their nonunion counterparts, younger and low
seniority union members are less satisfied with their jobs than are older
and more senior union members relative to their nonunion counterparts.
Finally, perceptions of union performance were found to be positively related
to positive job attitudes and positive evaluations of other job conditions.
--^ I .__ ___
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makers (and practitioners) need to know is what factors within the control
of the parties or public policy influence the variations in union effects
so that they can encourage efforts to, for example, improve safety, job
attitudes, and other job outcomes in the unionized sector of the economy.
Addressing this type of question should be the next challenge posed to
those interested in assessing the role that trade unions and collective
bargaining play in contemporary society.
*
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